View source for Manual:Security

<languages />
:'''<translate><!--T:1--> If you believe you have found a security problem in MediaWiki or in one of Wikimedia's web sites, see <tvar name=1>{{ll|Security}}</tvar> for contact information so we can prepare a bug fix release.</translate>'''
[[File:Securing MediaWiki Installation - EMWCon 2018.webm|thumb|<translate><!--T:158--> Brian Wolff presents on how to secure a MediaWiki installation at EMWCon 2018</translate>]]
<translate>
== Stay up to date == <!--T:2-->
</translate>
<translate><!--T:3--> The most important security step you can take is to keep your software up to date.</translate>
<translate><!--T:4--> Both MediaWiki and the software it depends on will occasionally produce new versions correcting newly-discovered security vulnerabilities which may affect you.</translate>

<translate><!--T:5--> The MediaWiki developers strongly recommend that anyone running MediaWiki subscribe to the [[<tvar name=mail>mail:mediawiki-announce</tvar>|mediawiki-announce mailing list]].</translate>
<translate><!--T:6--> This is a low-traffic list that sends out only new version announcements.</translate>

<translate><!--T:7--> In accordance with MediaWiki's [[<tvar name=1>Special:MyLanguage/Version lifecycle</tvar>|version lifecycle]], each release will receive security updates for one year.</translate>
<translate><!--T:8--> Older releases may contain known-but-unpatched security holes.</translate>

<translate>
<!--T:9-->
Don't forget to also keep up with updates to Apache, PHP, MySQL/MariaDB, and any other software running on your servers &ndash; both the operating system and other web applications.

== Be careful about which extensions you use == <!--T:116-->

<!--T:117-->
There are a wide variety of extensions available for MediaWiki. Unfortunately these extensions are also of a wide variety of quality levels. Using a low quality extension with MediaWiki is one of the most common causes of security issues for MediaWiki.
</translate>

<translate><!--T:118--> Before deciding to use an extension, you should do basic research on the extension.</translate>
<translate><!--T:185--> Extensions made by prominent members of the MediaWiki development community are usually quite safe.</translate>
<translate><!--T:186--> Similarly any extension used on a wiki run by the Wikimedia Foundation has probably been looked at carefully, and is probably safe (There are of course no guarantees).</translate>
<translate><!--T:187--> However if you find an extension floating around GitHub that hasn't been touched in many years and was developed by someone with little experience in web development, it is probably pretty high risk.</translate>

<translate>
<!--T:119-->
At the end of the day, you should evaluate the security risk of installing an extension the same way you would evaluate the security risk of installing any other piece of software.

<!--T:120-->
Extensions also need to be kept up to date like any other piece of software. Extensions bundled with MediaWiki have security announcements made to mediawiki-announce mailing list, but other extensions do not. Some, but definitely not all extensions announce security issues on mediawiki-l mailing list.

== File permissions == <!--T:121-->

<!--T:122-->
Another very important thing you should do to secure your MediaWiki installation: ''Make sure the user running php '''does not''' have write access to any web-accessible file or directory that php is enabled to run on.''
</translate>

<translate><!--T:197--> On Debian-based systems this means the <tvar name="1"><code>www-data</code></tvar> user '''should not''' own the php files.</translate>

<translate><!--T:123--> On unix-like systems, you can do this by ensuring that the mediawiki directory/files are owned by someone other than your web server user (www-data) or mysql server user.</translate>
<translate><!--T:159--> Depending on how you installed MediaWiki this may already be the case, but if not can be accomplished by doing {{<tvar name=1>tmpl|0=<code>chown -R &lt;$1> /path/to/MediaWiki/</code></tvar>|usernamehere}} where username is a user other than the webserver or mysql user (commonly you would use your own username provided <tvar name=mysql>mysql</tvar> and <tvar name=php>php</tvar> are not running as your username).</translate>
<translate><!--T:160--> After doing that step, you may however need to change the owner of the image directory back to the php user, as uploaded files need to go there, so MediaWiki needs to be able to write there (e.g. <tvar name=code2><code>chown -R www-data /path/to/MediaWiki/images</code></tvar>).</translate>
<translate><!--T:161--> Next you run <tvar name=code3><code>chmod -R go-w /path/to/MediaWiki</code></tvar> to remove write access from all other users besides the file owners. After doing that step you may need to re-enable write access to the images directory.</translate>

<translate><!--T:124--> Directories that MediaWiki needs write access to (such as <tvar name="1">{{wg|CacheDirectory}}</tvar> if that feature is enabled) should be located outside of the web root.</translate>
<translate><!--T:162--> The exception being the images directory, which must be in the web root.</translate>
<translate><!--T:163--> However, it is important to disable php in the images directory.</translate>
<translate><!--T:164--> The details on how to do this varies with webserver, but on apache it can sometimes be accomplished by using <tvar name=code1><code>php_flag engine off</code></tvar> in a <tvar name=htaccess>.htaccess</tvar> file.</translate>
<translate><!--T:165--> If you do accomplish this via a config file in the images directory itself, you should ensure the config file is not writable by the webserver.</translate>
<translate><!--T:166--> See the section below on upload security for more details.</translate>

<translate><!--T:125--> Your <tvar name=ls>{{ll|Manual:LocalSettings.php|nsp=0}}</tvar> file must be readable by the php user, however it should not be world readable, to prevent other processes from discovering your database password and other sensitive information.</translate>
<translate><!--T:167--> Like all MediaWiki files, the php user should not be able to write to <tvar name=1>LocalSettings.php</tvar>.</translate>

<translate>
<!--T:200-->
After changing permissions you may need to restart your web server for the changes to take effect.

== Transport Layer Security (TLS, HTTPS) == <!--T:126-->
</translate>
<translate><!--T:127--> To protect against [[w:firesheep|firesheep]] style attacks and general privacy leaks, it is recommended to host your site using TLS (HTTPS).</translate>
<translate><!--T:168--> A guide for setting up TLS is out of the scope of this document, however it should be noted that this is much cheaper now that <tvar name=letsencrypt>[https://letsencrypt.org letsencrypt.org]</tvar> provides free certificates.</translate>

<translate>
<!--T:128-->
If you do setup TLS, it is important to test your site with <tvar name=ssltest>[https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ ssllabs.com/ssltest/]</tvar> to ensure that it is setup properly, as it is easy to accidentally misconfigure TLS.
</translate>

<translate><!--T:129--> If you enable TLS, you may also want to configure your webserver to send the <tvar name=code><code>strict-transport-security</code></tvar> header.</translate>
<translate><!--T:169--> This will improve the security of your website against eavesdroppers quite a bit, but at the drawback that it means you cannot decide to stop using TLS for a set period of time.</translate>

<translate>
== General PHP recommendations == <!--T:11-->
</translate>

:''<translate><!--T:12--> Please refer to the OWASP [<tvar name=owasp>https://www.owasp.org/index.php/PHP_Security_Cheat_Sheet</tvar> PHP Security Cheat Sheet]</translate>''

<translate>
<!--T:13-->
These bits of advice go for pretty much any PHP environment, and are not necessarily specific to MediaWiki.

<!--T:14-->
PHP configuration recommendations, for <tvar name=phpini>{{ll|Manual:Php.ini|php.ini}}</tvar> or set otherwise:
</translate>

* <translate><!--T:19--> Unless you require it specifically, disable <tvar name=code><code>{{php-ini|allow_url_fopen}}</code></tvar>.</translate>
** <translate><!--T:20--> Remote PHP code execution vulnerabilities may depend on being able to inject a URL into a <tvar name="1">{{phpi|include()}}</tvar> or <tvar name="2">{{phpi|require()}}</tvar>. If you don't require the use of remote file loading, turning this off can prevent attacks of this kind on vulnerable code.</translate>
** <translate><!--T:21--> MediaWiki may require this setting to be on for the Lucene search extension, the OAI harvester extension, the <tvar name=1>TitleBlacklist</tvar> extension, and certain uses of <tvar name=2>Special:Import</tvar> in 1.5. It should not however be required in a typical installation.</translate>
** <translate><!--T:22--> MediaWiki should be safe even if this is on; turning this off is a precaution against the possibility of unknown vulnerability.</translate>
* <translate><!--T:23--> Set <tvar name=code><code>{{php-ini|session.use_trans_sid}}</code></tvar> off.</translate>
** <translate><!--T:24--> If this is on, session IDs may be added to URLs sometimes if cookies aren't doing their thing. That can leak login session data to third-party sites through referrer data or cut-and-paste of links.</translate>
** <translate><!--T:25--> You should always turn this off if it's on.</translate>

<translate>
<!--T:27-->
For instance if you see this line in php.ini:
</translate>

 allow_url_fopen = On

<translate>
<!--T:29-->
Change it to:
</translate>

 allow_url_fopen = Off

<translate>
<!--T:30-->
Alternatively, you could add this apache directive to turn off <tvar name=1><code>allow_url_fopen</code></tvar> on a per-directory basis:
</translate>

 php_flag allow_url_fopen off

<translate>
<!--T:102-->
Then restart Apache to reload the changes by <tvar name="1"><code>apachectl reload</code></tvar> or <tvar name="2"><code>rcapache2 reload</code></tvar> (SuSE).
</translate>

<translate><!--T:31--> On a multiuser system with PHP installed as an Apache module, all users' scripts will run under the same reduced-privilege user account.</translate>
<translate><!--T:170--> This may give other users access to read your configuration files (including database passwords), read and modify your login session data, or write files into your upload directory (if enabled).</translate>

<translate>
<!--T:32-->
For multiuser security, consider using a CGI/FastCGI configuration in which each user's scripts run under their own account.
</translate>

{{anchor|General MySQL recommendations}}
<translate>
== General MySQL and MariaDB recommendations == <!--T:34-->
</translate>
<translate><!--T:35--> In general, you should keep access to your MySQL or MariaDB database to a minimum.</translate>
<translate><!--T:171--> If it will only be used from the single machine it's running on, consider disabling networking support, or enabling local networking access only (via the loopback device, see below), so the server can only communicate with local clients over Unix domain sockets.</translate>

<translate><!--T:36--> If it will be used over a network with a limited number of client machines, consider setting the IP firewall rules to accept access to TCP port 3306 (MySQL/MariaDB's port) only from those machines or only from your local subnet, and reject all accesses from the larger internet.</translate>
<translate><!--T:172--> This can help prevent accidentally opening access to your server due to some unknown flaw in the database server, a mistakenly set overly broad GRANT, or a leaked password.</translate>

<translate><!--T:37--> If you create a new MySQL/MariaDB user for MediaWiki through MediaWiki's installer, somewhat liberal access is granted to it to ensure that it will work from a second server as well as a local one.</translate> <translate><!--T:173--> You might consider manually narrowing this or establishing the user account yourself with custom permissions from just the places you need.</translate>
<translate><!--T:174--> The database user only needs to have SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE permissions for the database.</translate>

<translate>
<!--T:130-->
In particular, the <tvar name=priv-file>[https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.7/en/privileges-provided.html#priv_file FILE]</tvar> privilege is a common cause of security issues. You should ensure that the MySQL/MariaDB user does not have this privilege or any of the "server administration" privileges.

<!--T:38-->
Note that the <tvar name=user><code>user</code></tvar> table in MediaWiki's database contains hashed user passwords and may contain user email addresses, and should generally be considered private data.

=== Maintenance scripts === <!--T:39-->
</translate>
<translate><!--T:40--> For the [[<tvar name=1>Special:MyLanguage/Manual:Maintenance scripts/Configuration</tvar>|maintenance scripts]], you might want to create a DB-admin-user with more rights.</translate>
<translate><!--T:41--> For this, set the following variables with the database credentials of that account:</translate>

* {{ll|Manual:$wgDBadminuser}}
* {{ll|Manual:$wgDBadminpassword}}

<translate>
<!--T:42-->
See <tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:Maintenance scripts/Configuration}}</tvar> for details on the needed MySQL/MariaDB rights.

=== Upgrade of MediaWiki === <!--T:43-->

<!--T:44-->
During upgrade, more MySQL/MariaDB rights might be needed.

=== More about MySQL and MariaDB=== <!--T:45-->
</translate>
* [http://dev.mysql.com/doc/mysql/en/server-options.html mysql command-line options]  <code>--skip-networking</code>.
* <translate><!--T:46--> Setting <tvar name=addr><code>bind-address=127.0.0.1</code></tvar> in your <tvar name=ini>my.ini</tvar> (under section <tvar name=mysqld><code>[mysqld]</code></tvar>) will cause MySQL/MariaDB to only listen on the loopback interface.</translate> <translate><!--T:175--> This is the default in the EasyPHP install for Windows. (If you are using MySQL/MariaDB on a Unix machine, the setting may be <tvar name=skip-net><code>skip-networking</code></tvar> instead in the <tvar name=cnf>my.cnf</tvar> file.)</translate>
* [http://dev.mysql.com/doc/mysql/en/grant.html <translate><!--T:131--> <tvar name=grant>GRANT</tvar> and <tvar name=revoke>REVOKE</tvar> syntax</translate>]

<translate>
== Leaks == <!--T:201-->

===If the database has leaked=== <!--T:47-->

<!--T:48-->
If the database was compromised, in <tvar name=ls>LocalSettings.php</tvar>:
</translate>

# <translate><!--T:49--> Change <tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:$wgDBpassword|$wgDBpassword}}</tvar> if that leaked too.</translate>
# <translate><!--T:50--> Change some letters in <tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:$wgSecretKey|$wgSecretKey}}.</tvar></translate>
# <translate><!--T:51--> Set <tvar name=3>{{wg|AuthenticationTokenVersion}}</tvar> to an unpredictable value to ensure that <tvar name=4><code>user_token</code></tvar> values in your database can't be used to impersonate your users.</translate>

<translate>
=== If <tvar name=1>LocalSettings.php</tvar> has leaked === <!--T:60-->

<!--T:61-->
If <tvar name=ls>LocalSettings.php</tvar> was compromised, reprotect it and:
</translate>

# <translate><!--T:132--> Change <tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:$wgDBpassword|$wgDBpassword}}</tvar></translate>
# <translate><!--T:133--> Replace <tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:$wgSecretKey|$wgSecretKey}}</tvar> with a different random string of letters and numbers</translate>
# <translate><!--T:134--> Make a different <tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:$wgSpamRegex|$wgSpamRegex}}</tvar> (optional)</translate>
# <translate><!--T:135--> Reset the <tvar name=1><code>user_token</code></tvar> column in your <tvar name=2><code>user</code></tvar> table so that it can't be used to impersonate any users</translate>

<translate>
== Database passwords == <!--T:62-->

<!--T:63-->
See <tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:Securing database passwords}}</tvar> for some precautions you may wish to take to reduce the risk of MySQL/MariaDB passwords being presented to the web.

== Alternate file layout == <!--T:64-->

<!--T:65-->
MediaWiki is designed to run in-place after being extracted from the distribution archive. This approach is convenient, but can result in reduced security or unnecessarily duplicated files.

<!--T:66-->
You  avoid duplicates in a mass installation or to keep sensitive files out of the web root for safety by manually relocating or consolidating various files.

<!--T:67-->
Moving the main includes and skin files may require carefully picking and choosing and altering the <tvar name=code><code>include_path</code></tvar> set in your <tvar name=ls><code>LocalSettings.php</code></tvar>.  Experiment with this as desired.
</translate>

<translate><!--T:68--> If working to improve security, keep in mind that <tvar name="1"><code>{{ll|Manual:WebStart.php|WebStart.php}}</code></tvar> uses the current directory as a base.</translate>
<translate><!--T:202--> This means that only setting your <tvar name="2"><code>include_path</code></tvar> may not help to improve the security of your installation.</translate>

<translate>
=== Move sensitive information === <!--T:69-->
</translate>
<translate><!--T:70--> Consider moving the database password or other potentially sensitive data from <tvar name="1"><code>{{ll|Manual:LocalSettings.php|LocalSettings.php}}</code></tvar> to another file located outside of the web document root, and including that file from <tvar name=ls><code>LocalSettings.php</code></tvar> (through <tvar name=include><code>include()</code></tvar>).</translate>
<translate><!--T:176--> This can help to ensure that your database password will not be compromised if a web server configuration error disables PHP execution and reveals the file's source text.</translate>

<translate><!--T:71--> Similarly, editing <tvar name="1"><code>LocalSettings.php</code></tvar> with some text editors will leave a backup file in the same directory with an altered file extension, causing the copy to be served as plain text if someone requests, for example, <tvar name="2"><code>LocalSettings.php~</code></tvar>.</translate>
<translate><!--T:188--> If you use such an editor, be sure to disable backup generation or move sensitive data outside the web root.</translate>

<translate><!--T:105--> A MediaWiki [[<tvar name=man>Special:MyLanguage/Manual:How to debug#Logging</tvar>|debug logfile]] as it is used for debugging also contains sensitive data.</translate>
<translate><!--T:72--> Make sure to always disallow access for non authorized persons and the public as explained, delete remains of such logfiles when they are not needed, and comment or clear the logfile lines in your <tvar name=ls><code>LocalSettings.php</code></tvar>.</translate>

<syntaxhighlight lang="php">
/**
 * The debug log file should never be publicly accessible if it is used, as it may contain private data.
 * But it must be in a directory writable by the PHP script running within your Web server. 
 */
# $wgDebugLogFile  = "c:/Logs/mediawiki/debug.log"; // Windows
$wgDebugLogFile  = "/var/log/mediawiki/{$wgSitename}-debug.log"; // Linux
</syntaxhighlight>

<translate>
=== Set <tvar name=1>DocumentRoot</tvar> to <tvar name=dev-null>/dev/null</tvar> === <!--T:73-->

<!--T:74-->
A more secure option for the Apache Web Server is to set the <tvar name="1"><code>DocumentRoot</code></tvar> to an empty or non-existent directory, and then use <tvar name=alias><code>Alias</code></tvar> directives in the Apache configuration to expose only the scripts and directories that need to be web-accessible.

=== Loader scripts === <!--T:75-->

<!--T:76-->
A PHP-only solution that will work with any web server is to write a series of scripts that explicitly <tvar name=chdir><code>chdir()</code></tvar> to a specific directory and then require one or more source files. For example:
</translate>

<syntaxhighlight lang="php">
<?php
chdir('/path/to/wiki');
require('./index.php');
</syntaxhighlight>

<translate>
== User security == <!--T:77-->
</translate>
<translate><!--T:78--> Anyone able to edit the user-interface [[<tvar name=sysmsgs>Special:MyLanguage/Help:System message</tvar>|certain system messages]] in the MediaWiki: namespace can introduce arbitrary JavaScript and CSS code into page output.</translate>
<translate><!--T:177--> This includes wiki users who have the <tvar name=1><code>editsitejs</code>/<code>editsitecss</code></tvar> permissions, as well as anyone with direct write access to the <tvar name=2><code>text</code></tvar> table in the database.</translate>

<translate><!--T:79--> These are mostly disabled at the login screen, so the risk of password-snarfing JavaScript should be minimal.</translate>
<translate><!--T:178--> Malicious code could still attempt to exploit browser vulnerabilities (install spyware, etc.), though, so, you should make sure that only trusted people can modify system messages.</translate>

{{anchor|Upload security}}
<translate>
== Upload security == <!--T:103-->
</translate>
: <translate><!--T:104--> See also:</translate> {{ll|Manual:Configuring file uploads}}

<translate>
<!--T:80-->
The main concern is: How do we prevent users from uploading malicious files?

<!--T:81-->
File uploads are an optional feature of MediaWiki and are disabled by default. If you enable them, you also need to provide a directory in the web root which is writable by the web server user.

<!--T:82-->
This has several implications for security:

<!--T:189-->
* The directory may have to be world-writable, or else owned by the web server's limited user account. On a multiuser system it may be possible for other local users to slip malicious files into your upload directory (see multiuser notes above).</translate> <translate><!--T:109--> If at all possible, make the directory writable only by the web server's account, don't make the directory world-writable.</translate>
<translate>
<!--T:110-->
* While PHP's configuration sets a file size limit on individual uploads, MediaWiki doesn't set any limit on total uploads. A malicious (or overzealous) visitor could fill up a disk partition by uploading a lot of files.</translate>
<translate>
<!--T:83-->
* Generated thumbnails and uploaded files held for overwrite confirmation may be kept in images/thumb and images/tmp without visible notice in the MediaWiki web interface. Keep an eye on their sizes as well.

<!--T:84-->
The default configuration makes an attempt to limit the types of files which can be uploaded for safety:

<!--T:107-->
* By default, file extensions .png, .gif, .jpg, .jpeg and webp are white listed (<tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:$wgFileExtensions|$wgFileExtensions}}</tvar>).</translate>
<translate>
<!--T:108-->
* Various executable and script extensions are explicitly prohibited (<tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:$wgProhibitedFileExtensions|$wgProhibitedFileExtensions}}</tvar>) even if you allow users to override the allowlist (<tvar name=2>{{ll|Manual:$wgStrictFileExtensions|$wgStrictFileExtensions}}</tvar>).</translate>
<translate>
<!--T:85-->
* Several known image file extensions have their types verified using PHP's <tvar name=1>{{php|getimagesize}}</tvar> function.</translate>
<translate>
<!--T:86-->
* Uploaded files are checked to see if they could trip file type detection bugs in Internet Explorer and Safari which might cause them to display as HTML.</translate> <translate><!--T:195--> (It has been proposed to remove this check, see <tvar name=1>[[phab:T309787|T309787]]</tvar>).</translate>

<translate><!--T:87--> As a precaution, you should explicitly disable server-side execution of PHP scripts (and any other scripting types you may have) in the uploads directory (by default, <tvar name=1><code>images</code></tvar>).</translate>
<translate><!--T:196--> You should also instruct browsers to not "sniff" files by setting a <tvar name=1><code>X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff</code></tvar> header.</translate>

<translate>
<!--T:88-->
For instance, an Apache .conf file fragment to do this if your MediaWiki instance is in <tvar name=path>/Library/MediaWiki/web</tvar> might look something like:
</translate>

<syntaxhighlight lang="apache">
<Directory "/Library/MediaWiki/web/images">
   # Ignore .htaccess files
   AllowOverride None
   
   # Serve HTML as plaintext, don't execute SHTML
   AddType text/plain .html .htm .shtml .phtml
   
   # Don't run arbitrary PHP code. (When using mod_php)
   php_admin_flag engine off
   # If using php-fpm, do the following instead:
   <FilesMatch "\.php$">
     SetHandler none
   </FilesMatch>

   # Tell browsers not to execute scripts
   Header set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline' data:; font-src data:; img-src data: 'self'; media-src data: 'self'; sandbox"

   # Tell browsers to not sniff files
   Header set X-Content-Type-Options nosniff
   
   # If you've other scripting languages, disable them too.
</Directory>
</syntaxhighlight>

<translate>
<!--T:89-->
If you don't have access to apache configuration files, but you can use <tvar name=htaccess1><kbd>.htaccess</kbd></tvar> files to override configuration settings on specific directories, you can put an <tvar name=htaccess2><kbd>.htaccess</kbd></tvar> file on the upload directory that looks like this:
</translate>

<syntaxhighlight lang="apache">
# Serve HTML as plaintext, don't execute SHTML
AddType text/plain .html .htm .shtml .phtml .php .php3 .php4 .php5 .php7

# Old way of registering php with AddHandler
RemoveHandler .php

# Recent way of registering php with SetHandler
<FilesMatch "\.ph(p[3457]?s?|tml)$">
   SetHandler None
</FilesMatch>

# If you've other scripting languages, disable them too.
</syntaxhighlight>

<translate>
<!--T:90-->
Your exact configuration may vary. In particular, the use of <tvar name=open_basedir>{{php-ini|open_basedir}}</tvar> options may complicate handling of uploads.

<!--T:190-->
If you use any of the above solution, you can check whether it's really working with this simple test.
</translate> 

* <translate><!--T:191--> Create a '<tvar name=1>test.php</tvar>' file in the upload directory.</translate>
* <translate><!--T:192--> Put <tvar name=1><syntaxhighlight lang=html inline><?php phpinfo();</syntaxhighlight></tvar> in the file.</translate>
* <translate><!--T:193--> Visit the file path in a web browser.</translate> <translate><!--T:194--> If you see just the text of the file you are good, otherwise something is wrong somewhere.</translate>

'''<translate><!--T:106--> Disable PHP solution for Nginx:</translate>'''
http://serverfault.com/a/585559/162909

<translate><!--T:111--> For best security, you should also consider using a separate domain for uploaded files.</translate>
<translate><!--T:112--> For full security it is best to have uploads served from an entirely separate domain, not a subdomain, but even a subdomain will provide additional security.</translate>
<translate><!--T:113--> This is especially important if you allow uploading SVG files since that file format is so similar to HTML.</translate>
<translate><!--T:114--> MediaWiki checks SVG uploads for security, but it is best to have multiple layers of defense.</translate>
<translate><!--T:115--> See <tvar name=1>{{ll|Manual:$wgUploadPath|$wgUploadPath}}</tvar> for configuring a different domain to serve media files.</translate>

<translate>

== External programs == <!--T:91-->
</translate>
* <translate><!--T:92--> <tvar name="1"><code>/usr/bin/diff3</code></tvar> may be executed for edit conflict merging.</translate>
* <translate><!--T:93--> If ImageMagick support for thumbnails or SVG images is enabled, <tvar name=convert><code>convert</code></tvar> may be run on uploaded files.</translate>
* <translate><!--T:198--> This list is incomplete.</translate>

<translate>
<!--T:199-->
You can use <tvar name="1">{{ll|Shellbox}}</tvar> to provide a more locked-down running environment for external commands.

==See also== <!--T:95-->
</translate>
* '''<translate><!--T:136--> General</translate>'''
** {{ll|Category:User access extensions}}
** <translate><!--T:179--> [[<tvar name=1>Special:MyLanguage/Manual:Configuration settings#Access</tvar>|Configuration Settings: Access]]</translate>
* '''<translate><!--T:137--> Planning/Requirements gathering</translate>'''
** {{ll|Manual:Installation requirements}}
* '''<translate><!--T:138--> User authorization</translate>'''
** [[AuthManager]] &ndash; <translate><!--T:139--> describes plug-in architecture for determining user identity</translate>
** {{ll|Manual:$wgAuthManagerConfig}} &ndash; <translate><!--T:140--> configuration variable used by plug-in architecture</translate>
** {{ll|Category:Authentication and login}} &ndash; <translate><!--T:141--> authorization extensions available</translate>
** {{ll|Manual:Resetting passwords}} &ndash; <translate><!--T:142--> reseting a MediaWiki user's password</translate> 
* '''<translate><!--T:143--> Monitoring user activity</translate>'''
** {{ll|Category:User activity extensions}}
* '''<translate><!--T:144--> Assignment of access rights by IP, user identity</translate>'''
** <translate><!--T:180--> [[<tvar name=1>Special:MyLanguage/Manual:FAQ#Initial user was not created by installer</tvar>|FAQ/Initial user was not created by installer]]</translate>
** <translate><!--T:181--> [[<tvar name=1>Special:MyLanguage/Manual:FAQ#Anti-spam</tvar>|FAQ/Anti-spam]]</translate>
** {{ll|Manual:User rights}} &ndash; <translate><!--T:145--> describes configuration of the default MediaWiki rights architecture</translate>
** {{ll|Manual:Preventing access}} &ndash; <translate><!--T:146--> various tips and how-to guides</translate>
** {{ll|Manual:Image authorization}} &ndash; <translate><!--T:147--> IP/user-based restrictions on access to images</translate>
** {{ll|Security issues with authorization extensions}}
** {{ll|Category:User rights extensions}} &ndash; <translate><!--T:148--> extensions that assist in user rights management</translate>
** {{ll|Extension:Lockdown}}
** <translate><!--T:149--> Configuration variables:</translate> {{ll|Manual:$wgGroupPermissions|$wgGroupPermissions}}, {{ll|Manual:$wgAddGroups|$wgAddGroups}}, {{ll|Manual:$wgRemoveGroups|$wgRemoveGroups}}, {{ll|Manual:$wgImplicitGroups|$wgImplicitGroups}}
* '''<translate><!--T:150--> Security-enhanced MediaWiki versions/sample installations</translate>'''
* '''<translate><!--T:151--> Security alerts</translate>'''
** {{ll|Security}} &ndash; <translate><!--T:152--> how to report problems, receive notifications</translate>
** {{ll|Category:Extensions with security vulnerabilities}}
** [[ModSecurity]]
* '''<translate><!--T:153--> Technical details</translate>'''
** <translate><!--T:182--> database schema:</translate> {{ll|Manual:User groups table}}, {{ll|Manual:User table}}, {{ll|Manual:Revision table}}, {{ll|Manual:Recentchanges table}}
** <translate><!--T:183--> hooks:</translate> {{ll|Manual:Hooks/UserLoginComplete|UserLoginComplete}}, {{ll|Manual:Hooks/UserLogout|UserLogout}}, {{ll|Manual:Hooks/UserLogoutComplete|UserLogoutComplete}}, {{ll|Manual:Hooks/UserEffectiveGroups|UserEffectiveGroups}}, {{ll|Manual:Hooks/UserGetRights|UserGetRights}}
** <translate><!--T:184--> code:</translate> {{file doclink|User}}
** {{ll|Manual:Special pages}} &ndash; <translate><!--T:154--> instructions for designing access rights-aware special pages.</translate>
* '''<translate><!--T:155--> [<tvar name=owasp>https://www.owasp.org/</tvar> Open Web Application Security Project] (OWASP)</translate>'''
* '''<translate><!--T:156--> [<tvar name=modsecurity>https://modsecurity.comodo.com/</tvar> Web Application Security - Modsecurity Rules] (WAS)</translate>'''
* '''{{ll|Security for developers}}''' &ndash; <translate><!--T:157--> for developers</translate>

[[Category:Security{{#translation:}}|*]]
[[Category:Installation{{#translation:}}]]